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ABSTRACT
New consent management platforms (CMPs) have been intro-
duced to the web to conform with the EU’s General Data Protec-
tion Regulation, particularly its requirements for consent when
companies collect and process users’ personal data. This work
analyses how the most prevalent CMP designs affect people’s
consent choices. We scraped the designs of the five most popular
CMPs on the top 10,000 websites in the UK (n=680). We found
that dark patterns and implied consent are ubiquitous; only 11.8%
meet the minimal requirements that we set based on European law.
Second, we conducted a field experiment with 40 participants to
investigate how the eight most common designs affect consent
choices. We found that notification style (banner or barrier) has no
effect; removing the opt-out button from the first page increases
consent by 22–23 percentage points; and providing more granular
controls on the first page decreases consent by 8–20 percentage
points. This study provides an empirical basis for the necessary
regulatory action to enforce the GDPR, in particular the possibility
of focusing on the centralised, third-party CMP services as an
effective way to increase compliance.
Author Keywords
Notice and Consent; Dark patterns; Consent Management
Platforms; GDPR; Web scraper; Controlled experiment
CCS Concepts
•Information systems → Online advertising; •Security and
privacy → Usability in security and privacy; •Social and
professional topics → Privacy policies; •Applied computing
→ Law;
INTRODUCTION
The predominant method of giving people some semblance of
control over their privacy while browsing the web is ‘notice and
choice’ or ‘notice and consent’ [20] . These mechanisms involve
showing an individual an informational statement and, depending
on their (in)action, acquiring or assuming their agreement to
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collecting, storing, and processing their data. To many, this
practice has become informally known as ‘cookie banners’.
What counts as sufficient notice, and what counts as legally-
acceptable consent, significantly differs depending on the
geographical and regulatory scope that an actor falls in. The
application in Europe of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [26] from May 2018, together with recent regulatory
guidance from data protection authorities (DPAs) and jurispru-
dence from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
has highlighted the illegality of the way ‘notice and consent’ has
hitherto functioned in the EU. These regulatory changes have
both clarified the concept of consent in European law, as well as
brought more significant (and extraterritorial) consequences for
flaunting these rules. EU law in particular focuses on the quality
of the consent required, and its freely-given, optional nature.
Consent management platforms (CMPs) have gained traction on
the Web to help website owners outsource regulatory compliance.
These (often third-party) code libraries purport to help websites
establish a lawful basis to both read and write information to
users’ browsers and to process these individuals’ personal data,
often for the purposes of tracking and complex advertising
transactions, such as ‘real-time bidding’ [31].
This intertwining of interface designs and data protection and
privacy law raises significant questions. This paper deals with
two of them:
1. What is the current state of interface design of CMPs in the
EU, and how prevalent are non-compliant design elements?
2. How do interface designs affect consent actions of users and,
by extension, how ‘freely given’ that consent is?
To answer the first question, we surveyed the designs of the 5
most commonly used third-party CMPs by scraping their varied
implementations on the top 10,000 most popular websites in the
United Kingdom (UK) (n=680); and evaluated them against Euro-
pean law and regulatory guidance. To answer the second question,
we built a browser plugin that injects consent notices into web-
pages and ran a controlled experiment (n=40) with eight different
interfaces to see how they affect participants’ consent responses.
CONSENT AND WEB TECHNOLOGIES UNDER EU LAW
EU law considers users’ devices and information within them part
of their private sphere. Relevant protection is extended to all EU
residents and to all individuals around the world being delivered
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online services from the Union. In light of a growing trend in the
early 2000s of rightsholders sneaking piracy-spotting rootkits onto
users’ devices [35], the ePrivacy Directive [25] was amended to
require that storing or accessing information on a user’s device not
‘strictly necessary’ for providing an explicitly requested service
requires both clear and comprehensive information and opt-in
consent [35]. This also applies to cookies, HTML web storage,
and fingerprinting in browsers providing non-essential features
such as tracking. Such consent is however, not required for
essential functions such as remembering login status, a shopping
cart, or cookies for data security required by law [14, 30].
The ePrivacy Directive is connected to definitions in European
data protection law, so when the GDPR [26] repealed and
replaced the Data Protection Directive 1995 [24] in 2018, these
practices became subject to new, heightened standards concerning
the quality of consent. The GDPR defines consent as “any freely
given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the
data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by
a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing
of personal data relating to him or her” [26, art 4(11)]. Several
aspects of this legal regime with design implications are important
to highlight here, which are drawn from the legal texts, regulators’
guidance, and court cases or opinions.
Freely given and unambiguous consent
Regulators and the Court of Justice of the EU have both
emphasised that for consent to be freely given and informed, it
must be a separate action from the activity the user is pursuing [3,
6, 18]. So-called ‘implicit’ or ‘opt-out’ consent — continuing to
use a website without active objection to a notice — is not a clear
positive action and as such will not establish a valid legal basis
to lay cookies or process data on the basis of consent [6, 14, 30].
As a consequence of the importance of the freely given nature
of consent, design matters for legal compliance. Pre-ticked boxes,
which require a positive action to opt-out from, are explicitly
singled out in the GDPR as an invalid form of consent [26, recital
32]. The Court of Justice has recently ruled that they were also not
a valid form of consent under the previous law, operational since
the mid-90s [18]. The UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office
further states that “[a] consent mechanism that emphasises ‘agree’
or ‘allow’ over ‘reject’ or ‘block’ represents a non-compliant
approach, as the online service is influencing users towards the
‘accept’ option.” Similarly, cookie boxes without a ‘reject’ option,
or where it is located in a ‘more information’ section or on a third
party webpage, are also non-compliant [30]. One of the CJEU’s
Advocates General (official impartial advisors to the Court on
cases raising new points of law) has emphasised the need that
both actions, “optically in particular, be presented on an equal
footing” [3, para 66].
Moreover, it must be “as easy to withdraw as to give consent” [26,
art 7(3)]. This means if consent was gathered through “only one
mouse-click, swipe of keystroke”, withdrawal must be “equally
as easy” and “without detriment” or “lowering service levels” [6].
An issue of continued contention is the validity of so-called
‘cookie walls’, whereby consent is a prerequisite to accessing a
website. While several regulators appear minded to suggest in
many or all cases this practice is illegal [7, 14, 23, 30], the issue
remains unclear [56] and the final conclusion will regardless
be subject to the “glacial flow” of the draft ePrivacy Regulation
through the EU’s legislative process [51].
Specific and informed consent
An important aspect of data protection is purpose limitation,
meaning users must consent in relation to a particular and specific
purpose for processing data. They cannot provide carte blanche
for a data controller to do whatever they like.1 These purposes
cannot be inextricably ‘bundled’, so an ‘accept all’ button is
only compliant if it is additional to the possibility of specifically
consenting to each purpose [14].
Furthermore, consent is invalid unless all organisations processing
this data are specifically named [14, 31]. Simply linking to an
external list of potential vendors, which may not represent the
code being run on the linking webpage, is “insufficient to provide
for free and informed consent” [31]. Consent should be able
to be rejected at the same level as the ‘accept’ button, so having
to navigate further to third party websites to reject tracking is
non-compliant [30]. Information required to be provided to data
subjects includes certain GDPR–mandated information (including
controller contact, processing purposes, legal basis, recipients and
sources of data, international transfers, storage period, data rights
and rights of complaint, and meaningful information about the
logic of significant automated decision-making) [26, arts 13–14],
as well as the duration of cookies [3, 30].
Efficient and timely data protection
Individuals have the right to ‘efficient and timely’ protection of
their data rights, meaning where consent is required, it is required
prior to data processing, not subsequently [6, 17]. Cookies must
not be set before the user has expressed their affirmative consent.
Furthermore, fresh consent is required when new, non-essential
cookies are being set by a new third party [6, 30]. The burden
is on the data controller to be able to demonstrate that they adhere
to data protection law and principles, including that they have
valid consent for each individual [26, art 5(2)].
RELATED WORK
Notice & Consent
The predominant model for communicating information privacy
protections to end-users has been notice(/awareness) and
consent(/choice). The interface designs of this model have mostly
been privacy policies and opt-in/out interfaces [20], which legally
can be seen as “pre-formulated declarations of consent”, or “click-
wrap” contracts [13]. The usability challenges of these interfaces
have seen considerable work across disciplines, largely divisible
in studies that establish the shortcomings of interface designs, and
studies proposing alternative technologies. Privacy policy notices
are notorious for taking a disproportionate amount of time to go
through and require reading comprehension abilities at university
level [32]. Privacy policies are rarely read by users [42, 43, 55]
prior to using or visiting a site/service. Users have been shown
to (almost automatically) consent without viewing them [2, 5, 8,
41, 42] since they stand in the way of the users’ primary goal:
accessing the service [2, 5]. This behaviour has been attributed to
1As an unalienable fundamental right, it is impossible for an EU resident
to ‘sign away’ their right to effective data protection.
(a) First page (b) Categories and purposes (c) Vendors/third-parties
Figure 1. The three components of the QuantCast CMP on https://sourceforge.net as of September 2019.
the users’ difficulty understanding how to make meaningful deci-
sions about their privacy preferences; but even in situations where
they are made aware of the implications of their decision, they
prefer short-term benefits over long-term privacy [2]. Because of
this, control mechanisms of these notices are considered illusory
in practice [12] — sometimes having devolved into merely an
informational statement rather than an interactive control panel.
The perceived ineffectiveness of this approach has given rise to
a number of design alternatives (for an overview of the entire
design space, see [46]). Gage Kelley et al. proposed standardised
“nutrition label” notices with icons representing the type of data
collected and how it is used, and showed how it helped users
find information more quickly and accurately [34]. Reeder et al.
developed an interactive matrix visualisation called Expandable
Grid which shows a colour-coded overview of a policy that can
be expanded for more detail [44]. The Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P) was an involved attempt to help automate
some of this process by building a machine-readable language
for expressing website privacy policies which could then interface
with user agents, such as the browser or other privacy applications
[19]. While it was implemented by Microsoft for Internet
Explorer and Edge, P3P never achieved widespread adoption,
partly because its comprehensiveness was seen as too complex
for regular website owners to apply but also because there was no
regulatory or political impetus to force browser vendors to use it.
The majority of studies around notice and consent have focused
on how well the interface design helps users make informed
decisions. This paper focuses more on the legal quality of the
consent that is collected.
Dark patterns
Interface designs that try to guide end-users into desired behaviour
through malicious interaction flows are referred to as “dark
patterns” [29]. As a phenomenon they are part of the larger
research agenda around persuasive design [27] and nudging [1,
50]. The practice of dark patterns for privacy notices — while
only sometimes discussed under this moniker in HCI and privacy
literature [9, 15, 29, 38]— is extensively reported on by consumer
protection organisations [28], white papers [49], and popular press
[47] (for an excellent overview, see the Norwegian Forbrukerrådet
document “Deceived by Design” [28]). Its infamy has led the
European Union and data protection officers to specifically
highlight certain common dark patterns as non-compliant
examples of the GDPR in its advisory documents such as privacy
intrusive default settings, hiding away privacy-friendly choices
and requiring more effort from the user to select it, illusory
or take-it-or-leave-it choices, etc. Senators from the United
States have recently introduced a draft bill specifically aimed
at outlawing such practices, stating that it should be prohibited
for any large online operator to “design, modify, or manipulate a
user interface with the purpose or substantial effect of obscuring,
subverting, or impairing user autonomy, decision-making, or
choice to obtain consent or user data” [21].
Since the submission of this paper, two studies have been released
that look specifically at the consent management platforms that
have appeared in response to the GDPR.
Utz et al [53] analysed a random sample of 1,000 CMPs and
manually categorised them along different design dimensions
(e.g., positioning, size, consent options). They found (among
other things) that a minimum of 57.4% used dark patterns to
nudge users to select privacy-unfriendly options, and that 95.8%
provide either no consent choice or confirmation only. They
conducted a follow-up experiment to test the effects of the
CMP position, the granularity and nudging of choices, and the
technicality of the language and presence of a privacy policy link.
They demonstrate that positioning the CMP in the lower (left)
part of the screen increases interaction rates; users are more likely
to accept tracking given a binary choice than when given more
granular options; acceptance rate increased from a mere 0.16% to
83.55% when options were preselected; and technical language
and privacy policies have a minor effect on consent choice.
The work by Matte, Bielova, and Santos [39] investigates the
actual consent signal sent from the CMP to the respective data
processors. They detect that 12.3% of 1,426 sites send a consent
signal before the user makes a choice. Semi-automatically review-
ing 560 sites reveals that 54%of them contain at least one violation
regarding the way consent is determined, asked, or complied with.
Empirical Studies of EU Privacy Regulation
Various studies have tried to chart the impact of European privacy
regulation on the collection and processing of personal data on the
web, both within its territorial scope and globally. A longitudinal
4-year study of the impact of the revised ePrivacy directive on
cookie placement shows that 1) 49% of websites placed cookies
before receiving consent; 2) 28% of websites did not provide any
consent mechanism; and 3) the percentage of websites violating
the directive stayed constant over the course of 4 years, indicating
the policy to be ineffective [52].
With respect to the GDPR, both industry and academia have
been monitoring its effects since being introduced in May 2018.
Degeling et al. [22] monitored the prevalence of privacy policies
on websites before and after the introduction of the regulation,
showing that in some EU member states the number of policies
increased by 15.7% (to a total of 84.5%), while 72.6% of sites
updated documents they already had. They estimate that a total of
62.1% of websites in Europe display a consent notice, an increase
of 16% since shortly before the regulation became enforceable.
Adzerk, an ad tech company, places this percentage considerably
lower, at a mere 20.4% [4], although their methodology is more
restrictive than Degeling et al.’s. Interestingly, QuantCast, one of
the largest CMP providers, also brought out a report stating that
over 90% of users (n=1bn) have consented to data processing [40].
Sanchez-Rola et al. [45] performed an evaluation of the tracking
undertaken by 2,000 high-traffic websites and evaluated how
information notices and actual tracking behaviour changed. They
found that the GDPR affected EU and US sites in the same
way, that consent management platforms reduced the amount of
tracking, but that personal data collection is still ubiquitous: 90%
still made use of cookies that were able to identify individual
users. Sørensen and Sokol [48] present a more nuanced picture of
the shifts in third-party tracker presence and behaviour, showing
a decrease mostly present in private websites, whereas websites
hosted by public institutions mostly stayed the same between
February and September 2018. Along the same lines, there exists
a difference between EU and non-EU private-sector sites, but little
difference in public sites. Depending on the purpose category
the tracker falls into, further distinctions can be made. The largest
shift was visible in data collection for advertising, and the least
in those used for cybersecurity. Overall, only 151 third-party
trackers are used by 1% or more of the websites, while the
remaining long-tail of 968 have a share of less than one percent.
STUDY 1: SCRAPING CMP INTERFACE DESIGNS
Little is known about many aspects of consent management
platforms on the Web, particularly around the consent modalities,
quality of this consent and related practices found in the field in
the European Union. The major five CMP vendors offer a wide
range of customisation options for their clients, and so from an
identification of the CMP vendor it does not follow that many
assumptions can be made about the interface design. To under-
stand the status quo of consent management plaform interface
design after the GDPR, we developed a web scraper to collect
information about the five most commonly used third-party CMPs
in the top 10,000 most-visited websites in the United Kingdom.
While their sophistication varies, surveyed CMPs all share
similarities in back-end function. When a user accesses a site, the
CMP detects their IP address and checks their cookies or local
storage for any previously set consent preferences, and retrieves
this data. If this fails, or if the CMP decides their preferences have
expired, the user is shown a consent notice, and their response is
recorded. This consent status is then passed on to any integrated
tag firing rules, ad servers, and real-time bidding platforms the
website has employed.
Visually, the CMP interfaces generally consist of three parts: 1)
a first page describing the general purpose of the consent pop-up,
with bulk consent options (‘accept all’ and, for some, ‘reject
all’) (Fig. 1a); 2) a second page with a more detailed description
of the different data processing categories or purposes (e.g.
personalisation, marketing), the ability to toggle them individually
or collectively, and a button to submit the current consent state
(Fig. 1b); and, 3) a third page with a breakdown of all the vendors
for whom the data is collected or with which it is shared, again
with the ability to toggle individually or collectively, and a button
to save these settings (Fig. 1c). Not all deployed CMPs have all
parts of these interfaces enabled.
Method
We built a Web scraper to collect data about the CMP’s visual
elements, interaction design, and text content (e.g. names of
data processing categories or vendors). The scraper utilised
the Python library Scrapy2 and JavaScript rendering service
Splash3. The variables the scraper collected included the CMP
vendor, the notification style (banner, barrier, other), the type of
consent (explicit or implicit) and specific user actions counted
as consent (consent/visit/navigation/reloading/scrolling/closing
the pop-up/clicking the page); the existence of accept and reject
all buttons and the minimum number of clicks to make them
available; for both vendors and categories/purposes, the existence
of lists of these, their extent and descriptions, whether or which
are enabled for user control, and their default state(s).
We ran the scraper from a Danish IP address4 over 3 days in
September 2019 over the top 10,000 UK sites according to web-
traffic service Alexa. We throttled our scraper to two concurrent
URL requests and no concurrent requests per domain, with a delay
of 2 seconds. We cycled through three different user agents copied
from our browsers to make sure the websites treated us as normal
visitors, rather than an automated crawler. The CMPs the scraper
was designed for are third-party services as identified by Adzerk
in August,5 which together account for ~58% of the market share:
QuantCast, OneTrust, TrustArc, Cookiebot, and Crownpeak. We
targetedUK sites, rather than sites across all EU countries, because
the Adzerk report gives us information about the total population
of CMPs in the UK market. This allowed us to check that our
scraper’s sample was representative both in number of CMPs iden-
tified and the overall distribution of the five most popular ones.
To determine the presence of a particular CMP, the scraper
looked for an identifying HTML element within 5–15 seconds of
arriving on the site (depending on the particular CMP and how it
injects the pop-up). Data to construct the variables were extracted
by querying for elements and attributes, traversing the DOM
if no unique indentifiers existed, or accessing globally scoped
objects. This data was pushed to aMongoDB database. Before
deployment, the data returned by the scraper was manually
2https://github.com/scrapy/scrapy
3https://github.com/scrapy-plugins/scrapy-splash
4Relevant legislation is harmonised across the EU and so a Danish IP
and UK IP are the same jurisdiction for our purposes.
5A company that does server-side ad serving and writes reports about
the state of the industry: www.adzerk.com
CMP Sites Median vendors
(low./upp. quartiles)
Explicit/implicit
consent
Banner/barrier Preticked
options
Minimum
compliance
Cookiebot 12.5% (85) 104 (61, 232) 45/40 78/7 64 (75.3%) 2 (5.6%)
Crownpeak 12.2% (83) 38.5 (18.8, 132.3) 46/37 52/31 67 (80.7%) 0 (0%)
OneTrust 24.3% (165) 58 (26.5, 104.5) 47/118 158/7 108 (65.4%) 3 (1.8%)
QuantCast 41% (279) 542 (542, 542) 279/0 132/147 90 (32.3%) 73 (26.2%)
TrustArc 10% (68) 87 (38, 152) 42/26 26/42 53 (77.9%) 2 (2.9%)
all 680 315 (58, 542) 459/221 446/234 382 (56.2%) 80 (11.8%)
Table 1. Key statistics on scraped CMPs.
validated with 40 randomly selected sites from the list of 10,000
for each of the five CMPs. The scraper code and dataset will be
available as supplementary material alongside the paper.
Understanding compliance
Based on the above section on EU law, we consider three core,
measurable conditions that providers will have to meet to be
considered legally compliant for the purpose of this study. This
serves as a minimum hurdle: meeting these conditions alone will
not guarantee compliance with the law, as there are a multitude of
aspects and provisions, many of which can only be appropriately
assessed qualitatively. However, these are conditions that are
testable with the variables from our scraper, and therefore provide
a window on the maximum level of compliance in the industry
today. These conditions are:
Consent must be explicit This condition is true if consent is a
clear, positive, affirmative act, such as clicking a button, rather
than e.g. continuing to navigate a website.
Accepting all is as easy as rejecting all Consent must be as
easy to give as to withdraw/refuse. This condition is met if
accepting all takes the same number of clicks as rejecting all,
and automatically not met in the case where consent requires
no clicks (i.e. Condition 1 is violated)
No pre-ticked boxes Consent to any vendor or purpose must be
through affirmative acts at all granularity. If no non-necessary
purposes or vendors are automatically on, this condition is met.
Factors which could contribute to non-compliance which we did
not examine include qualitatively considering the information
provided (e.g. specificity of purposes, contact details of vendors,
provision of the duration of cookies), nor certain visual features
such as colour or size or prominence of buttons beyond clicks.
Results
680 (6.8%) of the top 10,000 UK websites contained a CMP
which could be successfully scraped by our tool. According to
a survey of the top 10K UK websites in August 2019 [4], only
20.35% of the top 10K UK websites are reported to use a CMP
(from any vendor). 1191 of those (i.e., 58.52%) use the top
5 CMPs, which means the 680 instances our scraper captured
represents 57.09% of the total population6.
6It should be noted that Adzerk’s methodology counts CMPs by URL
endpoints of the Javascript files and we found during development that
websites frequently include inactive CMPs’ .js files. This means that Adz-
erk’s statistics are likely inflatedwith double-counting, and that our survey
is consequently more representative than the 57.09% would indicate.
We found that implicit consent is common among these sites
(32.5%). An array of actions that websites count as consent (but
which EU law does not) was extracted from their code, such as
just visiting the site (16.8%), navigating within the site (6.2%),
revisiting/refreshing the page (7.6%), scrolling or clicking on
the page (5.3%) or closing the pop-up or banner (1.6%). 9% of
sites accepted more than one form of implicit consent. With only
a handful of idiosyncratic exemptions all implied consent was
found in the use of ‘banner’ rather than ‘barriers’ (a barrier style
is in Fig. 1). Within those CMPs exhibiting explicit consent, there
was a roughly even split between the use of barriers and banners
(50.3%/49.7%). Popular CMP implementation wizards still allow
their clients to choose implied consent, even when they have
already indicated the CMP should check whether the visitor’s IP
is within the geographical scope of the EU, which should be mu-
tually exclusive. This raises significant questions over adherence
with the concept of data protection by design in the GDPR.
The vast majority of CMPs make rejecting all tracking substan-
tially more difficult than accepting it. 50.1% of sites did not have
a ‘reject all’ button. Only 12.6% of sites had a ‘reject all’ button
accessible with the same or fewer number of clicks as an ‘accept
all’ button. In practice, this means both were accessible on the
first page— an ‘accept all’ button was never buried in a second
layer. 74.3% of reject all buttons were one layer deep, requiring
two clicks to press; 0.9% of them were two layers away, requiring
at minimum three.
Furthermore, when users went to amend specific consent
settings rather than accept everything, they are often faced
with pre-ticked boxes of the type specifically forbidden by the
GDPR [26, recital 32]. 56.2% of sites pre-ticked optional vendors
or purposes/categories, with 54.1% of sites pre-ticking optional
purposes, 32.3% pre-ticking optional categories, and 30.3%
pre-ticking both. Our scraper was detecting visual status rather
than functional status—we do not know the impact on toggling
on or off vendors or categories beyond what the CMP tells the
user is happening (Matte et al.’s [39] findings indicate 7.7% of
CMPs ignore the consent signal submitted by the user).
Sites relied on a large number of third party trackers, which would
take a prohibitively long time for users to inform themselves
about clearly. Out of the 85.4% of sites that did list vendors (e.g.
third party trackers) within the CMP, there was a median number
of 315 vendors (low. quartile 58, upp. quartile 542). Different
CMP vendors have different average numbers of vendors, with
the highest being QuantCast at 542 (see Table 1). 75% of sites
had over 58 vendors. 76.47% of sites provide some descriptions
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Figure 2. UpSet diagram [16, 36] of sites by adherence to three core conditions of EU law. Sites meeting all three in green.
of their vendors. The mean total length of these descriptions
per site is 7985 words: roughly 31.9 minutes of reading for the
average 250 words-per-minute reader, not counting interaction
time to e.g. unfold collapsed boxes or navigating to and reading
specific privacy policies of a vendor.
As discussed, we consider that a site is minimally compliant if
it has no optional boxes pre-ticked, if rejection is as easy as ac-
ceptance, and if consent is explicit. Only 11.8% of sites met these
basic requirements. The interaction between the requirements
is shown in Figure 2. This varied significantly by CMP vendor —
as shown in Table 1, only Quantcast has a non-negligible number
of CMPs that we consider minimally compliant (26.2%), with
Crownpeak having zero (that we found). This can largely be
explained by the non-existence of implicit consent in QuantCast
CMPs and their lower levels of pre-ticked boxes.
Interim Discussion
Given that all vendors (with the exception of Crownpeak) have
examples in the wild of minimally compliant CMPs, it is unclear
whether non-compliance is a practical result of sites configuring
it in a non-compliant manner, being encouraged to do so by the
CMP vendors or, in some cases, running older CMPs without
updating them in light of the more publicised nature of the
law.7 Whatever the practical reasons, 11.8% is an extraordinarily
low number for seemingly market-leading CMP vendors, and
suggests an urgent role for data protection authorities to take
action to ensure only correct configurations are permitted.
The dataset in this study will be available to other researchers, and
we welcome further research into, for example, the scraped text
content of the CMPs, as the 11.8% in this study is a maximum
value that is likely to only decrease on consideration of further as-
pects of the law which are harder to assess in a formulaic manner.
Limitations
Although we manually validated the scraper, we cannot guarantee
that there are no false negatives or false positives in our dataset.
Because these CMPs are dynamically rendered via JavaScript,
determining whether the state of the DOM scraped is the final one
7Note that the recent judgement from the European Court of Justice
clarified that these requirements have been part of EU law since 2012,
rather than just since the GDPR [18]
is tricky (further complicated by the fact that Scrapy’s engine runs
on ECMAScript 2015 making tools to deal with asynchronous
execution, such as async/await, unavailable). We hardcoded a
waiting time of 5-15 seconds between loading the site and scrap-
ing the content which should be more than sufficient, but there
might be exceptions. The CMPmight be customised either by the
company or the website owner, thwarting the automated way we
identify the presence of elements. Legacy implementations, either
from various iterations over the years or because the company has
been sold multiple times, also introduced branches in the CMP
code we might have missed. While we did our best to identify
and work around elements of the CMPs designed to obfuscate
their function and prevent automation, deliberate changes to
data retrieval are often used to foil research for those studying
APIs [10, 11], and such practices seem likely in this domain also
to protect against potential automated regulatory scrutiny.
STUDY 2: EFFECTS OF DESIGNS ON ANSWERS
The goal of the second studywas to establish if, and to what extent,
certain CMP designs affect the consent answer given by users. We
were interested in non-compliant designs that are very prevalent,
or designs that are not yet described as non-compliant by the appli-
cable regulation. We conducted two field experiments to establish
the effects on user behaviour and consent rate of 1) barrier and ban-
ner notifications; 2) equal and unequal prominence of accept all
and reject all options on the first page; and 3) the level granularity
of consent options on the first page (bulk, purposes, vendors).
Method
Design
The study consisted of two counter-balanced experiments,
evaluating a total of 8 different interfaces (see Figure 3).
Experiment 1 used a [2x2] latin square, within-subjects, repeated
measures design. The independent variables were the NOTIFICA-
TION STYLE (Barrier; Banner) and BULK CONSENT BUTTONS
(Accept all+Reject all; Accept all). The primary dependent
variable was the CONSENT ANSWER (Accept all; Reject all;
Submit default; Submit personalised).
Experiment 2 used a [1x4] latin square, within-subjects, repeated
measures design. The independent variable was the CON-
SENT GRANULARITY (Bulk; Bulk+Purposes; Bulk+Vendors;
Bulk+Purposes+Vendors) on the first page of the notification.
The primary dependent variable was the CONSENT ANSWER
(Accept all; Reject all; Submit default; Submit personalised).
Participants
A total of 40 participants successfully finished both experiments,
with a mean age of 26.1 and standard deviation of 8.68 The
majority, 30, had a university degree (17 Bachelor, 12 Master,
1 Doctorate). Seven had some college credit but no degree,
and three a highschool diploma. 28 participants were currently
studying and 12 were employed full-time. All participants were
residing in the United States for the duration of the study, and
did not travel to the EU. We selected this sample to prevent the
confounding effects of real CMPs, which would have popped-up
on top of our injected one if the participants were in the EU and
thus in the regulatory scope of the GDPR. Four participants lived
in the EU in the past five years, meaning they might already be
familiar with pop-ups from the ePrivacy directive. All participants
used Google Chrome as their main browser.
Participants were recruited through one of the author’s personal
network and a university mailing list. They were offered $50
upon completion of the study, and an additional $10 if they
successfully recommended others.
Apparatus and Materials
The materials and apparatus of this study include a pre-study
survey, a browser extension, and a post-study survey.
The pre-study survey consisted of 11 questions designed to gather
demographic information (age, employment status, highest degree
obtained, country of residence), check whether the participants
met the study criteria (devices used to browse the web, main
browser, travelling to the EU during the study), and acquire their
informed consent.
To expose the participants to the different interface designs in
a controlled yet ecologically realistic context, we developed a
browser extension that injects different pop-ups into any website
that participants would visit during their normal daily browsing
(available as open-source after publication). The designs of the
eight interfaces (i.e., conditions) were inspired by the designs
of the top five Consent Management Platforms also used for the
scraper study: QuantCast, OneTrust, TrustArc, Cookiebot, and
Crownpeak.
All the text, data processing purposes, and vendor names were cre-
ated by synthesising those commonly used by a random selection
of those CMPS in the top 500 Alexa websites in the UK. The data
processing purposes are a combination of the options that the five
CMPs give to website owners when they create their own pop-up,
or the purposes those websites came up with themselves. The
vendor names were copied from existing websites, and picked
to represent one of four categories: well-known companies (e.g,
“Yahoo!”), foreign companies with English names (e.g., “Beijing
Interactive Marketing”), foreign companies with non-English
names (e.g., “Programatica de publicidad S.L.”), and gibberish
names (e.g., “s_vi_bikx7Becalgbkjkxx”).
8Age was reported using brackets of ten years so we are unable to report
the exact range; the answers were assumed to be normally distributed
to calculate the mean.
The extension used the open-source JavaScript database PouchDB
to store the participants’ interactions with the interfaces locally,
which was synchronised with a CouchDB instance running on
OpenStack over an SSL encrypted connection.
The post-study survey consisted of four questions asking the
participants to reflect on their general pop-up answering strategy,
showed them a visualisation of their actual answers, and asked
them to describe howwell those answers fit their ideal preferences.
Procedure
A recruitment email was sent to potential participants asking
them to join a study about web-tracker activity in the United
States compared to the European Union, and answer the pre-study
survey. Once approved, the participants were assigned and
emailed a participant number and a link to the Chrome extension
on the Chrome Web Store. After installing the extension, a
welcome screen automatically appeared asking the participants to
fill in their assigned number. This connected the installation to the
participant number in the CouchDB database, where each partic-
ipant was matched to a pre-determined experiment and condition
order. Once the extension was successfully activated, a pop-up
appeared notifying the participants the experiment had started.
To train the participants and homogenise their understanding of
the CMPs they received an additional email that informed them
they might sometimes see consent pop-ups (ostensibly when they
were shown the European version of a website instead of the US
equivalent), explained how those pop-ups worked, and instructed
them to answer the pop-ups according to their preferences.
The extension injected a pop-up every fourth url visited –
including navigations on the same page, excluding automatic
redirects or urls for which an answer was already recorded – to
approximate the realistic frequency with which consent pop-ups
are currently shown9. Each interface condition was repeated
four times, requiring the participants to answer sixteen pop-ups
per experiment. All interactions with the pop-up were recorded
and timestamped: clicking on the elements, toggling purposes
or vendors, scrolling the lists, navigating back and forth between
the pages, submitting a consent response. Interfaces which were
not interacted with were re-appended to the list of conditions
and shown again for a maximum of five times, after which it
was recorded as “not answered” (similar to a participant clicking
or scrolling through the interface without providing a consent
response). Once all conditions of the first experiment were
answered, the participant progressed to the second experiment.
After completing both experiments, the participants were notified
by email that the study was finished, informed that they could
uninstall the extension, and asked to complete the post-study
survey. The completion time of the experiment ranged from four
days to three weeks, depending on how many unique urls the
participant visited per day (e.g., some participants mostly visited
the same websites, some went on holiday during the experiment,
some installed the extension on their secondary device and only
used it a couple days per week).
Data analysis
Although originally 48 participants finished the experiment, we
removed eight of them because they mentioned in the survey that
9Based on Adzerk’s Ad-Tech Insights report: [4]
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 3. The 8 interface conditions: (a) Banner / Accept + Reject; (b) Barrier / Accept + Reject; (c) Bulk; (d) Bulk + Purposes; (e) Banner / Accept; (f) Barrier
/ Accept; (g) Bulk + Vendors; (h) Bulk + Purposes + Vendors.
their answers were affected by the study (e.g., some participants
said they chose “accept all” because they wanted to give more
data, despite the instructions they received). To analyse the
effects of interface design on consent answers we created a linear
regression model with fixed effects; we treated the participants as
a factor to account for their (assumed) stable privacy preferences.
Results
General interaction patterns
Of the four possible consent choices – accept all, reject all, submit
preferences, no answer – the vastmajority of answers submitted by
participants was through the bulk options (89.3%), with a skew to-
wards accepting: 55.2% (707) accept all versus 34.1% (437) reject
all. Just 9.7% (124) of answers represent the “submit preference”
option, and 0.9% (12) were “no answer” (but recorded interac-
tions). Of those 124 “submit” answers, merely 21 – given by 6
participants –were personalised answers, instead of submitting the
default status (all toggled off). Four of those 21 were personalised
by clicking the “Toggle All” button, whichmeans only 17 answers
out of 1280 (1.3%) represent a participant consenting to a specific
selection of purposes or vendors.Whether this is because users are
unable to make such decisions, are not interested in that level of
detail, or fatigued by the form and frequency of the question is un-
clear; but it does indicate that users’ consent is rarely empirically
as "specific" as the GDPR requires it to be. It does not follow that
specific controls should therefore be removed, but rather that such
specificity could be distributed to other actors invited by the user
(e.g., browser agents, consent predictors, a knowledgeable friend).
Almost all interactions (93.1%) were limited to the first page of
the pop-up the participants were exposed to. Seven out of eight
interfaces had a “more options” link to navigate to a second or
third page for more information and granular consent choices, but
this was clicked only 88 times (6.9%). When participants were
exposed to a scrollable list of data collection purposes or vendors
on the first or subsequent pages (560 occasions), they ignored
it 68.6% (384) of the time. Of the 176 instances they did scroll,
21.6% (38) were between 0 and 25 percent of the list, and 64.2%
(113) between 75 and 100 percent. In other words, anything not
immediately visible to the user, anything requiring interaction
to access, might as well not exist.
Notification style
The validity of one design element still under discussion by policy
makers is that of the notification style [56]: a barrier in the middle
of the screen which prevents the user from interacting with the
website until a response is recorded, or a banner stretching the
width of the screen that does not block access to the information .
We found that notification style did not affect the consent rate
of participants. Two simple linear regressions were calculated
to investigate the relationship between the answer given (accept
or not) and notification style (banner or barrier). The first,
comparing BARRIER to BANNER with both the Accept and
Reject button, did not find a regression line at all (F(1,279) =
0.000, p = 1). The second, comparing BARRIER to BANNER
with just the Accept button, found a non-significant relationship
(p = 0.702), with a slope coefficient of 0.013 (95% CI min and
max of−0.052 and 0.077 respectively) and an R2 of 0.001.
While there was no difference in acceptance rate when participants
actually answered the pop-up, the banner notification was ignored
3.6 times more often than the barrier. For this statistic we consid-
ered any pop-up that was not interacted with, but which had a time
difference of at least 3 seconds between being injected and the tab
being closed, as “ignored”; 133 of such instances were found, with
only 21.1% (28) for the barrier and 78.9% (106) for the banner.
Button prominence
Data from our scraper indicates ‘accept all’ and ‘reject all’ buttons
are not displayed with equal prominence: only a mere 12.6%
of sites show both on the same page. Such unequal prominence
of consent options is already considered non-compliant with the
GDPR [3, 30] because it is expected they affect consent answers,
but the severity of its impact is unknown.
We found that removing the ‘reject all’ button from the first page
increased the probability of consent by 22−23 percentage points.
We calculated two simple linear regressions to analyse the rela-
tionship between the answer given (accept or not) and the consent
options on the first page (accept and reject, or just accept). The
first, comparing ACCEPT ALL + REJECT ALL to ACCEPT ALL for
the barrier notification, found a strong positive linear relationship
between the two. The significant (p < 0.001) slope coefficient for
the consent answer was 0.220, meaning the accept rate increased
on average by 22.0 percentage points when the reject all button
was removed from the first page. The 95% CI had a minimum
and maximum of 0.149 and 0.290 respectively. The R2 was 0.117,
so 11.7% of the variation in answers for the barrier notification
can be explained by the changing prominence of the buttons.
The second regression compared ACCEPT ALL + REJECT ALL
to ACCEPT ALL for banner notifications and found a similarly
strong, positive linear relationship between the button prominence
and answer given. The significant (p < 0.001) slope coefficient
was 0.231, meaning the accept rate increased on average by 23.1
percentage points when the reject all button was removed from
the first page. The 95% CI had a minimum and maximum of
0.163 and 0.230 respectively. The R2 was 0.135, so 13.5% of the
variation in answers for the banner notification can be explained
by the changing prominence of the buttons.
Level of granularity
The most common order in which consent options are displayed is
bulk first, followed by the data collection purposes on the second
page and the vendors on the third page, or some combination of
those two on the same page.
We found that displaying more granular consent choices on
the first page decreased the probability of consent by 8−20
percentage points. We calculated a simple linear regression to
compare a BULK only interface to an interface that combined
BULK + PURPOSES; BULK + VENDORS; and BULK + PUR-
POSES + VENDORS on the same page. We found a significant
(p < 0.01) negative relationship between all increases in the level
of granularity of consent options and the answer given, with
different strengths depending on the kind of options that were
available. As illustrated by Table 2, showing just the vendors
affected the acceptance rate the most (−0.200), whereas just
the purposes (−0.088) and the combination of vendors and
purposes (−0.119) were closer together but still lower than the
baseline interface with just bulk options. Along the same lines,
the 95% CIs overlap most between PURPOSES and PURPOSES
+ VENDORS and only a little with VENDORS.
Table 2. Level of granularity on the first page, with bulk consent as the
reference
Dependent variable: 95% CI:
‘accept all’ clicked lower : upper
Bulk + Purposes −0.088∗∗ −0.151 : −0.024
(0.032)
Bulk + Vendors −0.200∗∗∗ −0.263 : −0.137
(0.032)
Bulk + Purposes −0.119∗∗∗ −0.182 : −0.056
+ Vendors (0.032)
Observations 640
R2 0.062
F Statistic 13.210∗∗∗ (df = 3; 597)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Participant Strategies and Behaviour Patterns
While the experimental data suggests how different designs affect
how “freely given” the consent answers of participants are, it does
not provide information about how those answer relate to their pre-
ferred privacy settings. In a post-study survey, we requested partic-
ipants to describe their overall answering strategy, showed them a
visualisation of their actual behaviour, and then asked them to state
how well their answers reflected their ideal preferences and, if not,
why. To structure these findings, we classify participants accord-
ing to their general consent answers: always accept, mostly accept
(>= 75%), mixed consent, mostly reject (>= 75%), always reject.
When asked what they based their choices on, the answers
touched on eleven different topics. The four ‘always accept’
participants cited a general apathy towards privacy concerns and
“just did it to make the window go away”. The one participant
that ‘always rejected’, no matter whether that required more
effort, argued that they would only accept data collection if it
was to use a particular feature offered by the site. The eleven
participants categorised as ‘mostly reject’ heavily emphasised
a disagreement with the practice of tracking in general and stated
they would only consent to have their data collected if it was
for websites they trusted. Two of those also mentioned that they
did not feel a need for any personalisation. The participants that
fell into the ‘mostly accept’ and ‘mixed consent’ category were
more diverse. Most often mentioned were pragmatic reasons
such as just wanting to get to the site as quickly as possible, not
believing the controls were meaningful, and not wanting to lose
any functionality. Eight decided based on trust, whether it was the
website or the vendors, and the sensitivity of the data they would
be submitting (e.g., banking information). One participant stated
that they relied on other methods to protect their privacy, so did
not care that much about their pop-up answers: “I tend to vary my
devices/browsers/accounts/use incognito and duckduckgo a lot,
I’m not too worried about my data being tracked to every detail.”
After being shown a visualisation of their actual consent behaviour
and asked if it matched their ideal settings, the responses were
predominately that it did not. Only those falling into the two
extreme categories – ‘always accept’ and ‘always reject’ – all
indicated they agreed (3) or strongly agreed (2) with their answers.
For the remaining three categories, the sentiments were mostly
spread evenly along the spectrum, with 11 somewhat agreeing,
3 neither agreeing nor disagreeing, 7 somewhat disagreeing, 1
disagreeing, and 3 strongly disagreeing.
The 25 participants who indicated their behaviour did not match
their ideal privacy settings were asked to explain what the reason
for this difference was. Participants mentioned desires such
as just wanting more privacy (“I would rather companies not
collect any information”); the fear of unknown consequences of
opting-out (“I didn’t want to risk the website not working after
that”); and not knowing what their ideal preferences even are.
The most common reason mentioned, however, was the interface
design. Participants lamented the fact that pop-ups stand in the
way of their primary goal (accessing a service), that the frequency
of the pop-ups caused frustration and consent fatigue, and even
the perception that the pop-up “forced them to accept” – even
though these options were available on the second page.
Interim Discussion
The experimental results indicate how two of the most common
consent interface designs – not showing a ‘reject all’ button on
the first page; and showing bulk options before showing granular
control – make it more likely for users to provide consent,
violating the principle of “freely given”10. The notification style,
on the other hand, appears to have no effect on the answer, but
possibly a large effect on whether an answer is given at all, sug-
gesting that a non-blocking mechanism provides a desired third
consent option to users: a neutral middle-ground. The qualitative
reflections of the participants, however, put into question the
entire notice-and-consent model not because of specific design
decisions but merely because an action is required before the
user can accomplish their main task and because they appear too
frequently if they are shown on a website-by-website basis.
Limitations
The participant sample is by no means representative of the
general population in the United States: they are almost all
young and university-educated, and recruited primarily through
an emailing list of a computer science department. Arguably,
this means that our results describe a “best case scenario”: these
participants should be more knowledgeable about privacy issues
and better equipped to understand consent interfaces than the
average web user.
There are a number of confounding variables that could
have affected the participants’ answers. First, although the
condition order was counterbalanced, we cannot guarantee that
the participants were actually exposed to them in that order
(e.g., if they opened multiple tabs in a row and visited them
anachronistically), meaning order effects might not be controlled
for. Second, because we showed the same pop-up to each
participant until we recorded four answers per interface, some
participants were exposed to the different conditions more often
than others. Lastly, participants might have also encountered
“real” pop-ups at the same time as the injected ones if the website
they were visiting was within the territorial scope of the GDPR.
While the GDPR is a European policy, our experiments were
conducted in the United States. These populations have been
exposed to different legal regimes and different consent controls
over the year, something which we expect has affected their
mental model of these kind of pop-ups and accordingly, how
they answer them. This might influence the extent to which these
findings can be generalised to a European population, and thus
how they should be used to inform EU policy changes.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The results of our empirical survey of CMPs today illustrates the
extent to which illegal practices prevail, with vendors of CMPs
turning a blind eye to — or worse, incentivising —- clearly
illegal configurations of their systems. Enforcement in this area
is sorely lacking. Data protection authorities should make use
of automated tools like the one we have designed to expedite
discovery and enforcement. Designers might help here to design
tools for regulators, rather than just for users or for websites. Reg-
ulators should also work further upstream and consider placing
requirements on the vendors of CMPs to only allow compliant
designs to be placed on the market. Such enforcement may
be possible as the Court of Justice indicates that plugin system
designers can be ‘joint controllers’ along with websites [17,
10It should be noted this data alone is not enough to establish legal
compliance.
37, 54], and the UK’s ICO indicates it may be willing to force
advertising trade bodies to alter their standards [31]. If this is the
case, regulators must carefully consider how to build a robust and
well-maintained evidence base for user-centric CMP design.
A core takeaway from the user study is that placing controls or
information below the first layer renders it effectively ignored.
This leaves a few options for genuine control of tracking online. If
the notice-and-consent model is to continue, it may be necessary
to declare that, for example, consent can never be valid with
the presence of the (on average) hundreds of third parties we
have shown data is sent to and cookies laid by today. This would
mean consent would only be valid if a compact but representative
and rich description can be placed on the first layer, and could
certainly be a possible direction for the Court of Justice to consider
if they interpret the principles of data protection in a future case.
An alternative approach would be to overhaul the design pattern
of the consent banner or barrier, and have richer, more durable
ways to set preferences, potentially within the browser. The key
is that such browser settings would be legally binding, rather than
weak and self-regulatory in nature. Yet the current heavy lobbying
around the EU’s draft ePrivacy Regulation has centred in part
on adtech firms trying to prevent browser settings having legally
binding effect — part of an ongoing drama for many years about
the potential legal status of ‘DoNot Track’ signals [33]. Designers
have a role here: how can users reflect on tracking across theWeb,
rather than on a per-site basis? If users are not to automatically
reject everything, how can advertisers negotiate and present them
with reasons that they should consent? Might there be a role for
delegation of preferences to a trusted civil society actor, and what
kind of relationship, information and interaction might the user
have with these? We invite and encourage researchers to bring
their skills and views to bear on these important, current issues
at the confluence of regulation, design and fundamental rights.
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